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Abstract 
We examme the economiC reasons underlying the behavior of some senior managers to inflate 
theIr firms' reported earnmgs While the extant literature cites accounting and corporate 
governance structure as potentlal reasons that facilitate the inflating tendency, we conjecture that 
opportunism at different hierarchical levels within firms do not leave much scope for some senior 
managers to improve firms' flllldamental performance. To protect their persona.l utility, they resort 
to inflating tendency, but only if the firms' corporate governance has loopholes. A major solution 
offered here is to improve firms' internal management control system which could reduce within-
firm opportunism. However, this solution must accompany improvements to corporate 
governance. 
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1. introduction 
"On March [9, 2003, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) charged 
HealthSouth Corporation and its CEO with 
accounting fraud The SEC's complaint 
alleged that HealthSouth had systematically 
overstated its earnings by at least $1. 4 billion 
since 1999. Apart pom the SEC's finding, the 
Us. Justice Department used information 
gathered from HealthSouth executives to 
identify another $1.1 billion of overstated 
earnings" (Weld, BergeVin and Magrath. 
2004). 
HealthSouth is just one of the many firms that 
adopted Enron's infamous path ill inflating their 
reported earnings. The outcome of this inflation is 
well documented. The market prices reflect a value 
which is more than the underlying economic value of 
the firm. Over time, the gap between marke1 
expectations and firm value becomes so high that the 
finn becomes incapable of meeting the expectations 
which, in turn, leads to 'over-valued equity' (Jensen, 
2005). Unfortunately, the fact of inflated earnings 
typically becomes transparent to the market only after 
the over-valuation arises. At this stage, the 'bubble' 
bursts. Legal actions are initiated; courts conduc1 
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inquiry, order liquidation and final settlement takes 
place after several years. If liquidation is ordered for 
several firms in an economy, the economy suffers an 
investment decline and enters a downturn. 
Earlier studies such as Weld et al. (2004) offer 
empirical evidence on such over-valuation. The 
reasons center around managerial opportunism: some 
senior managers inflate thei]" firms' earnings to obtain 
their bonus which is tied to the better market price 
performance (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). The 
underlying assumption here is that increase in firm 
earnings leads to a rise in the market price. As the 
market price rises, the senior managers are motivated 
to maintain this inflating tendency with a view to 
avoid any potential market price decline and seize 
greater personal wealth. We believe that this 
managerial opportunism logic does not provide a 
complete economic rationale for the senior managers' 
inflating tendency, particularly in the light of the 
following argument. 
Better firm earnings can be posted by one of the 
two routes; either (a) enhance fundamental 
perfonnance or (b) inflate reported earnings. 
Enhancing performance refer to improving 
fundamental variables such as capacity, quality, lead 
time and delivery. However, much in line with the 
saying, "if you can't make it, fake it", some senior 
~ ® 
INTERI'RESZ 
I2!JI!!if 
C01porate Ownersliip d. (bntro( / %{ume 5, Issue 1, 'Faf[ 2001- Colttirmea- 3 
managers systematically adopt the inflating route 
until the day the over-valuation bubble bursts. A 
more important question is that why do some senior 
managers adopt inflating route to better results 
instead of improving firm fundamentals? In this 
paper, we examine this research problem and offer 
some potential solutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we identify the economic 
causes that offer scope for some managers to indulge 
in inflating their firms' reported earnings. Potential 
solutions to the economic causes are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Economic Causes 
2.1 Review of Lliterature 
One stream of the extant literature (e.g., lidding, 
2003; Litan, 2002) cites the inherent lapses in the 
accounting regulation as the main cause for the 
inflating tendency. This stream argues that a 
multitude of accounting choices that are available 
often provide scope for accountants and senior 
managers to develop the inflating tendency. In 
Litan's words, "the fact is that for many kinds of 
transactions, there are no single' right' answers ... The 
lack of specifics allows accountants greater discretion 
in deciding how to justify various transactions". For 
instance, future revenues that do not accrue are 
falsely recognized in the current period resulting in 
undue increase in gross profits. Similarly, several 
provisions are cut a little bit from their normal write-
down amounts to create a sizeable increase. in net 
profits. Though not many solutions l'!reldentltied to 
this cause, a few studies focus on improving 
fundamental auditing legislation such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. 
Another stream of the literature (e.g., Downes 
and Russ, 2005; Jensen, 2005) focuses largely on the 
corporate governance argument. They examine the 
structure of firms' existing corporate governance 
which includes the composition (external versus 
internal directors), directorship tenure, entrenchment 
in committees, formulation of ethics code and 
validation procedures of the board of directors and 
how this corporate governance structure allows the 
inflating tendency to flourish in firms. If a finn, for 
instance, has more non-permanent external directors 
depending on the CEO, who also chairs tbe board, 
then the CEO is more likely in a convenient position 
to inflate reported earnings. In sum, prior studies 
identify market price-related bonus in the presence of 
multiple accounting choices and 'easy' corporate 
governance enable some senior managers to innate 
reported earnings. 
The above two streams of the extant literature 
are valid in their own perspectives but we believe that 
they still answer only a part of our research problem. 
By adopting the first route of improving the firm 
fundamentals to post better results, not only can the 
senior managers enhance their own utility such as 
bonus but do so in perfectly legal and ethical manner 
devoid of any lurking fear of punishment. And so, a 
question remains. What prevents these managers 
from not seeking to improve the firm fundamentals? 
We believe that the answer to this question is 
important to complete our research problem and 
hence forms the core economic argument of this 
paper. 
One answer is that enhancing fundamentals 
takes a long time as against a quick adjustment to the 
reported earnings. This is not entirely correct given 
the fact that the market price-related bonus (such as 
stock options and grants) is awarded typically on a 
long term basis and thus most senior managers has 
one or more years to improve their firms' 
fundamental performance. If some senior managers 
do not resort to improving firm performance even 
when they have this time, there must be a stronger 
underlying economic reasons causing their inflating 
behavior. 
2.2 Economic Causes 
Let us first examine the process by which some 
senior managers inflate reported earnings which, in 
turn, leads to over-valued equity. Throughout the 
period of inflated earnings, the firm acts as a 'black-
box' to outsiders, which means that very little 
decision-relevant information about the finn flows to 
the market until the stage of over-valuation. 
The 'black-box' assumption is also implicitly 
held in other studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1992 
and Williamson, 1981) that examine transactions 
witbin firms. In most firms, no one person is likely 
to hold complete information about all parts of the 
firm. Even senior managers with large spans of 
control are no exception. Jensen and Meckling 
(1992) suggest specific knowledge, a knowledge 
piece that is difficult to transfer or acquire as one 
major reason. A worker's long experience in 
comprehending customer needs, which is costly to 
acquire, is an example of specific knowledge. 
The specific knowledge that a person holds can 
induce opportunistic actions in certain circumstances. 
When does opportunism arise within firms and how 
do firms control the problems of opportunism are 
matters examined in economic theories such as 
agency and transaction cost economics. In general, 
these theories suggest if a firm invests in specific 
knowledge, scope for oppottunism within firms is 
high when the accompanying incentive and control 
structures are not tuned to manage the potential 
problems of specific knowledge. A major problem 
which arises in specific knowledge is 'asymmetry', 
which means that one party holds more decision-
relevant information than the other. The party can 
potentially use such information to augment his/ber 
own utility at the cost of the other. 
Two examples of opportunistic actions within 
firms are as follows. At the lower levels of a firm's 
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hierarchy, a worker can use specific knowledge to 
hide his/her inefficiency from the manager but still 
claim the bonus. At a higher level, a divisional 
manager can also depend on specific knowledge on 
discretionary budgets to postpone spending on a 
critical activity such as research advertisement in 
order to show better divisional incomes, which, in 
tum, can fetch higher bonus from the CEO. Note that 
opportunism within firms has a negative outcome of 
eroding firms' economic value. Not only a part of 
shareholders' wealth is seized by different employee 
groups; but also there is a likely decline in the firms' 
overall profitability because of reduced productivity 
of the employees who act in opportunism. 
We now link this 'within-the-tirm' 0ppOltunism 
with senior managers' tendency to inflate reported 
earnings. Though senior managers are able to see the 
negative outcome, they are not able to detect the 
underlying reasons because of the calculated 
opportunism that can occur within firms. Therefore, 
senior managers are not always able to improve their 
firms' fundamental performance. If the senior 
managers of all the firms that invest in specific 
knowledge (or any other specific resource) are 
affected by potential within-the-firm opportunism, 
then why only some managers tend to apply inflating 
practices? The answer lies in the nature of corporate 
governance in firms. Though most senior managers 
are rewarded by share price based bonus and they 
have access to multiple accounting choices, only 
some managers enjoy 'easy' corporate governance, 
which is too tempting to ignore. Hence, some senior 
managers resort to the second route, which is to 
inflate the reported earnings. 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
Figure 1 summarizes the link 
within-the-firm opportunism and 
managers' inflating tendency. 
3. Potential Solutions 
between the 
the senior 
We now turn to examine the potential solutions for 
firms to discourage inflating tendency. One way, 
though not the best solution, is to remove the market-
price related bonus for the senior managers. Note 
however that this way cannot solve the within-the-
firm opportunism, which is often the driving 
economic cause for the inflating tendency. A better 
solution is to start reforming firms' internal 
management control system (hereafter MCS). MCS 
must cover three inter-related elements: I) who will 
do what job and how much; 2) how will the job 
performance be assessed; and 3) how can the 
performance be motivated. These tlu'ee elements are 
cited as the legs of a 'three-legged stool' (Brickley, 
Smith and Zimmerman, 2001). MCS goes out of tune 
whenever one (or two) of its elements are not 
compatible with other elements. For instance, if a 
manager gives more decision rights to a worker but 
continues to assess the worker's performance based 
on earlier authority level, then the additional rights 
may be used by the person for his own welfare. 
Improving a firm's MCS at the lower and higher 
levels of hierarchy can be handled at the senior 
manager's level. But a key question remains here. 
Where does the motivation lie for the senior 
managers to reform hislher firm's MCS? This is 
where the impOltance of reforming a firm's corporate 
governance arises1• Firms need to have 'tight' 
corporate governance structure. For instance, firms 
must need a balance between external and internal 
directors; rotate the membership in committees and a 
rigorous decision evaluation criteria based on both 
profitability and ethics for board functioning. Note 
that the 'tightness' in the corporate governance 
structure serves two objectives. First, it can oversee 
the CEOs' performance in terms of reforming MCS. 
Second, it can also ensure that the CEO and other 
senior managers do not steer the firm into the second 
route of inflating reported earnings. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the tendency of some 
senior managers to inflate firms' reported earnings 
instead of improving fundamentals such as quality, 
capacity and costs. Identifying a new relation 
between the opportunism that occurs within-the firm 
and the inflating tendency, we conjecture that when 
senior managers are less able to curb the within-the-
firm opportunism which erodes firm value, they 
resort to inflating earnings. We offer a potential· 
solution to discourage inflating tendency in the form 
of improved MCS in conjunction with a tight 
corporate governance structure. One limitation of our 
paper is the lack of empirical evidence to analyze if 
the theoretical predictions laid out hold well in the 
real-world. In this direction, a useful extension to 
this paper is to test the theoretic predictions through 
experimental research method wherein the problem 
and the solution variables can be manipulated to 
analyze the effects. 
Another extension in terms of theoretical 
research is in the potential solution to our research 
problem. One could examine if all the stakeholders 
beginning with workers and then managers, CEOs 
and share holders could be considered in a multiple 
but linked stakeholder value chain. Each stakeholder 
link can be linked to the next link through a set of 
I The term MCS is used in ~ bro~d sense in the 
management ~ccounting hter~turc (sec Chcnhall, 2003) 
which includes even the corporate governance 
structure. However, for the purpose of easy exposition, 
we distinguish the two terms in our paper as follows. 
While MCS relates to controls at lower and higher 
hieratchic~l levels of management, corporate 
governance refers exclusively to structure of board of 
directors. 
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principal-agent relationships. For instance, while 
shareholders and CEO can be treated as a principal 
and agent respectively, the CEO and the managers 
can also be treated as principal and agent 
simultaneously. Each agent could then be 
compensated on a uniform basis though at different 
rates to suit the nature and risks associated with 
different agents' jobs. The purpose of this solution is 
to see how value can be generated to shm'eholders 
(the first link in the stakeholder value chain) vallie 
whenever a worker (the last link in the stakeholder 
value chain) earns bonus for carrying out his/her job 
efficiently, 
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1. introduction 
"On March [9, 2003, the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) charged 
HealthSouth Corporation and its CEO with 
accounting fraud The SEC's complaint 
alleged that HealthSouth had systematically 
overstated its earnings by at least $1. 4 billion 
since 1999. Apart pom the SEC's finding, the 
Us. Justice Department used information 
gathered from HealthSouth executives to 
identify another $1.1 billion of overstated 
earnings" (Weld, BergeVin and Magrath. 
2004). 
HealthSouth is just one of the many firms that 
adopted Enron's infamous path ill inflating their 
reported earnings. The outcome of this inflation is 
well documented. The market prices reflect a value 
which is more than the underlying economic value of 
the firm. Over time, the gap between marke1 
expectations and firm value becomes so high that the 
finn becomes incapable of meeting the expectations 
which, in turn, leads to 'over-valued equity' (Jensen, 
2005). Unfortunately, the fact of inflated earnings 
typically becomes transparent to the market only after 
the over-valuation arises. At this stage, the 'bubble' 
bursts. Legal actions are initiated; courts conduc1 
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inquiry, order liquidation and final settlement takes 
place after several years. If liquidation is ordered for 
several firms in an economy, the economy suffers an 
investment decline and enters a downturn. 
Earlier studies such as Weld et al. (2004) offer 
empirical evidence on such over-valuation. The 
reasons center around managerial opportunism: some 
senior managers inflate thei]" firms' earnings to obtain 
their bonus which is tied to the better market price 
performance (Cheng and Warfield, 2005). The 
underlying assumption here is that increase in firm 
earnings leads to a rise in the market price. As the 
market price rises, the senior managers are motivated 
to maintain this inflating tendency with a view to 
avoid any potential market price decline and seize 
greater personal wealth. We believe that this 
managerial opportunism logic does not provide a 
complete economic rationale for the senior managers' 
inflating tendency, particularly in the light of the 
following argument. 
Better firm earnings can be posted by one of the 
two routes; either (a) enhance fundamental 
perfonnance or (b) inflate reported earnings. 
Enhancing performance refer to improving 
fundamental variables such as capacity, quality, lead 
time and delivery. However, much in line with the 
saying, "if you can't make it, fake it", some senior 
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managers systematically adopt the inflating route 
until the day the over-valuation bubble bursts. A 
more important question is that why do some senior 
managers adopt inflating route to better results 
instead of improving firm fundamentals? In this 
paper, we examine this research problem and offer 
some potential solutions. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. In Section 2, we identify the economic 
causes that offer scope for some managers to indulge 
in inflating their firms' reported earnings. Potential 
solutions to the economic causes are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Economic Causes 
2.1 Review of Lliterature 
One stream of the extant literature (e.g., lidding, 
2003; Litan, 2002) cites the inherent lapses in the 
accounting regulation as the main cause for the 
inflating tendency. This stream argues that a 
multitude of accounting choices that are available 
often provide scope for accountants and senior 
managers to develop the inflating tendency. In 
Litan's words, "the fact is that for many kinds of 
transactions, there are no single' right' answers ... The 
lack of specifics allows accountants greater discretion 
in deciding how to justify various transactions". For 
instance, future revenues that do not accrue are 
falsely recognized in the current period resulting in 
undue increase in gross profits. Similarly, several 
provisions are cut a little bit from their normal write-
down amounts to create a sizeable increase. in net 
profits. Though not many solutions l'!reldentltied to 
this cause, a few studies focus on improving 
fundamental auditing legislation such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US. 
Another stream of the literature (e.g., Downes 
and Russ, 2005; Jensen, 2005) focuses largely on the 
corporate governance argument. They examine the 
structure of firms' existing corporate governance 
which includes the composition (external versus 
internal directors), directorship tenure, entrenchment 
in committees, formulation of ethics code and 
validation procedures of the board of directors and 
how this corporate governance structure allows the 
inflating tendency to flourish in firms. If a finn, for 
instance, has more non-permanent external directors 
depending on the CEO, who also chairs tbe board, 
then the CEO is more likely in a convenient position 
to inflate reported earnings. In sum, prior studies 
identify market price-related bonus in the presence of 
multiple accounting choices and 'easy' corporate 
governance enable some senior managers to innate 
reported earnings. 
The above two streams of the extant literature 
are valid in their own perspectives but we believe that 
they still answer only a part of our research problem. 
By adopting the first route of improving the firm 
fundamentals to post better results, not only can the 
senior managers enhance their own utility such as 
bonus but do so in perfectly legal and ethical manner 
devoid of any lurking fear of punishment. And so, a 
question remains. What prevents these managers 
from not seeking to improve the firm fundamentals? 
We believe that the answer to this question is 
important to complete our research problem and 
hence forms the core economic argument of this 
paper. 
One answer is that enhancing fundamentals 
takes a long time as against a quick adjustment to the 
reported earnings. This is not entirely correct given 
the fact that the market price-related bonus (such as 
stock options and grants) is awarded typically on a 
long term basis and thus most senior managers has 
one or more years to improve their firms' 
fundamental performance. If some senior managers 
do not resort to improving firm performance even 
when they have this time, there must be a stronger 
underlying economic reasons causing their inflating 
behavior. 
2.2 Economic Causes 
Let us first examine the process by which some 
senior managers inflate reported earnings which, in 
turn, leads to over-valued equity. Throughout the 
period of inflated earnings, the firm acts as a 'black-
box' to outsiders, which means that very little 
decision-relevant information about the finn flows to 
the market until the stage of over-valuation. 
The 'black-box' assumption is also implicitly 
held in other studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1992 
and Williamson, 1981) that examine transactions 
witbin firms. In most firms, no one person is likely 
to hold complete information about all parts of the 
firm. Even senior managers with large spans of 
control are no exception. Jensen and Meckling 
(1992) suggest specific knowledge, a knowledge 
piece that is difficult to transfer or acquire as one 
major reason. A worker's long experience in 
comprehending customer needs, which is costly to 
acquire, is an example of specific knowledge. 
The specific knowledge that a person holds can 
induce opportunistic actions in certain circumstances. 
When does opportunism arise within firms and how 
do firms control the problems of opportunism are 
matters examined in economic theories such as 
agency and transaction cost economics. In general, 
these theories suggest if a firm invests in specific 
knowledge, scope for oppottunism within firms is 
high when the accompanying incentive and control 
structures are not tuned to manage the potential 
problems of specific knowledge. A major problem 
which arises in specific knowledge is 'asymmetry', 
which means that one party holds more decision-
relevant information than the other. The party can 
potentially use such information to augment his/ber 
own utility at the cost of the other. 
Two examples of opportunistic actions within 
firms are as follows. At the lower levels of a firm's 
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hierarchy, a worker can use specific knowledge to 
hide his/her inefficiency from the manager but still 
claim the bonus. At a higher level, a divisional 
manager can also depend on specific knowledge on 
discretionary budgets to postpone spending on a 
critical activity such as research advertisement in 
order to show better divisional incomes, which, in 
tum, can fetch higher bonus from the CEO. Note that 
opportunism within firms has a negative outcome of 
eroding firms' economic value. Not only a part of 
shareholders' wealth is seized by different employee 
groups; but also there is a likely decline in the firms' 
overall profitability because of reduced productivity 
of the employees who act in opportunism. 
We now link this 'within-the-tirm' 0ppOltunism 
with senior managers' tendency to inflate reported 
earnings. Though senior managers are able to see the 
negative outcome, they are not able to detect the 
underlying reasons because of the calculated 
opportunism that can occur within firms. Therefore, 
senior managers are not always able to improve their 
firms' fundamental performance. If the senior 
managers of all the firms that invest in specific 
knowledge (or any other specific resource) are 
affected by potential within-the-firm opportunism, 
then why only some managers tend to apply inflating 
practices? The answer lies in the nature of corporate 
governance in firms. Though most senior managers 
are rewarded by share price based bonus and they 
have access to multiple accounting choices, only 
some managers enjoy 'easy' corporate governance, 
which is too tempting to ignore. Hence, some senior 
managers resort to the second route, which is to 
inflate the reported earnings. 
(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE) 
Figure 1 summarizes the link 
within-the-firm opportunism and 
managers' inflating tendency. 
3. Potential Solutions 
between the 
the senior 
We now turn to examine the potential solutions for 
firms to discourage inflating tendency. One way, 
though not the best solution, is to remove the market-
price related bonus for the senior managers. Note 
however that this way cannot solve the within-the-
firm opportunism, which is often the driving 
economic cause for the inflating tendency. A better 
solution is to start reforming firms' internal 
management control system (hereafter MCS). MCS 
must cover three inter-related elements: I) who will 
do what job and how much; 2) how will the job 
performance be assessed; and 3) how can the 
performance be motivated. These tlu'ee elements are 
cited as the legs of a 'three-legged stool' (Brickley, 
Smith and Zimmerman, 2001). MCS goes out of tune 
whenever one (or two) of its elements are not 
compatible with other elements. For instance, if a 
manager gives more decision rights to a worker but 
continues to assess the worker's performance based 
on earlier authority level, then the additional rights 
may be used by the person for his own welfare. 
Improving a firm's MCS at the lower and higher 
levels of hierarchy can be handled at the senior 
manager's level. But a key question remains here. 
Where does the motivation lie for the senior 
managers to reform hislher firm's MCS? This is 
where the impOltance of reforming a firm's corporate 
governance arises1• Firms need to have 'tight' 
corporate governance structure. For instance, firms 
must need a balance between external and internal 
directors; rotate the membership in committees and a 
rigorous decision evaluation criteria based on both 
profitability and ethics for board functioning. Note 
that the 'tightness' in the corporate governance 
structure serves two objectives. First, it can oversee 
the CEOs' performance in terms of reforming MCS. 
Second, it can also ensure that the CEO and other 
senior managers do not steer the firm into the second 
route of inflating reported earnings. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the tendency of some 
senior managers to inflate firms' reported earnings 
instead of improving fundamentals such as quality, 
capacity and costs. Identifying a new relation 
between the opportunism that occurs within-the firm 
and the inflating tendency, we conjecture that when 
senior managers are less able to curb the within-the-
firm opportunism which erodes firm value, they 
resort to inflating earnings. We offer a potential· 
solution to discourage inflating tendency in the form 
of improved MCS in conjunction with a tight 
corporate governance structure. One limitation of our 
paper is the lack of empirical evidence to analyze if 
the theoretical predictions laid out hold well in the 
real-world. In this direction, a useful extension to 
this paper is to test the theoretic predictions through 
experimental research method wherein the problem 
and the solution variables can be manipulated to 
analyze the effects. 
Another extension in terms of theoretical 
research is in the potential solution to our research 
problem. One could examine if all the stakeholders 
beginning with workers and then managers, CEOs 
and share holders could be considered in a multiple 
but linked stakeholder value chain. Each stakeholder 
link can be linked to the next link through a set of 
I The term MCS is used in ~ bro~d sense in the 
management ~ccounting hter~turc (sec Chcnhall, 2003) 
which includes even the corporate governance 
structure. However, for the purpose of easy exposition, 
we distinguish the two terms in our paper as follows. 
While MCS relates to controls at lower and higher 
hieratchic~l levels of management, corporate 
governance refers exclusively to structure of board of 
directors. 
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principal-agent relationships. For instance, while 
shareholders and CEO can be treated as a principal 
and agent respectively, the CEO and the managers 
can also be treated as principal and agent 
simultaneously. Each agent could then be 
compensated on a uniform basis though at different 
rates to suit the nature and risks associated with 
different agents' jobs. The purpose of this solution is 
to see how value can be generated to shm'eholders 
(the first link in the stakeholder value chain) vallie 
whenever a worker (the last link in the stakeholder 
value chain) earns bonus for carrying out his/her job 
efficiently, 
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